Abstract. Skipjack is the secret key encryption algorithm developed by the NSA for the Clipper chip and Fortezza PC card. It uses an 80-bit key, 128 table lookup operations, and 320 XOR operations to map a 64-bit plaintext into a 64-bit ciphertext in 32 rounds. This paper describes an e cient attack on a variant, which we call Skipjack-3XOR (Skipjack minus 3 XORs). The only di erence between Skipjack and Skipjack-3XOR is the removal of 3 out of the 320 XOR operations. The attack uses the ciphertexts derived from about 500 plaintexts and its total running time is equivalent to about one million Skipjack encryptions, which can be carried out in seconds on a personal computer. We also present a new cryptographic tool, which we call the Yoyo game, and e cient attacks on Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds. We conclude that Skipjack does not have a conservative design with a large margin of safety.
Introduction
Skipjack is the secret key encryption algorithm developed by the NSA for the Clipper chip and Fortezza PC card. It was implemented in tamper-resistant hardware and its structure was kept secret since its introduction in 1993.
To increase con dence in the strength of Skipjack and the Clipper chip initiative, ve well known cryptographers were assigned in 1993 to analyze Skipjack and report their ndings 4]. They investigated the strength of Skipjack using di erential cryptanalysis 3] and other methods, and concentrated on reviewing NSA's design and evaluation process. They reported that Skipjack is a \repre-sentative of a family of encryption algorithms developed in 1980 as part of the NSA suite of \Type I" algorithms, suitable for protecting all levels of classi ed data. The speci c algorithm, SKIPJACK, is intended to be used with sensitive but unclassi ed information." They concluded that \Skipjack is based on some of NSA's best technology" and quoted the head of the NSA evaluation team who con dently concluded \I believe that Skipjack can only be broken by brute force -there is no better way."
On June 24th, 1998, Skipjack was declassi ed, and its description was made public in the web site of NIST 7] . It uses an 80-bit key, 32 4 = 128 table lookup operations, and 32 10 = 320 XOR operations to map a 64-bit plaintext into a 64-bit ciphertext in 32 rounds. This paper summarizes our initial analysis. We study the di erential 3] and linear 6] properties of Skipjack, together with other observations on the design of Skipjack. Then, we use these observations to present a di erential attack on Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds, using about 2 22 chosen plaintexts and steps of analysis. Some of these results are based on important observations communicated to us by David Wagner 8] .
We present a new cryptographic tool, which we call the Yoyo game, applied to Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds. This tool can be used to identify pairs satisfying a certain property, and be used as a tool for attacking Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds using only 2 14 adaptive chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and 2 14 steps of analysis. This tool can also be used as a distinguisher to decide whether a given black box contains this variant of Skipjack, or a random permutation.
We then present the main result of this paper, which is an exceptionally simple attack on a 32-round variant, which we call Skipjack-3XOR (Skipjack minus 3 XORs). The only di erence between the actual Skipjack and Skipjack-3XOR is the removal of 3 out of the 320 XOR operations. The attack uses the ciphertexts derived from about 500 plaintexts which are identical except for the second 16 bit word. Its total running time is equivalent to about one million Skipjack encryptions, which can be carried out in seconds on a personal computer. We thus believe that Skipjack does not have a conservative design with a large margin of safety. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the structure of Skipjack, and the main variants that we analyze in this paper. In Section 3 we present useful observations on the design, which we later use in our analysis. In Section 4 we describe a di erential attack on a 16-round variant of Skipjack. The Yoyo game and its applications are described in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present our main attack on Skipjack-3XOR. 
Description of Skipjack
The published description of Skipjack characterizes the rounds as either Rule A or Rule B. Each round is described in the form of a linear feedback shift register with an additional non linear keyed G permutation. Rule B is basically the inverse of Rule A with minor positioning di erences. Skipjack applies eight rounds of Rule A, followed by eight rounds of Rule B, followed by another eight rounds of Rule A, followed by another eight rounds of Rule B. The original de nitions of Rule A and Rule B are given in Figure 1 , where counter is the round number (in the range 1 to 32), G is a four-round Feistel permutation whose F function is de ned as an 8x8-bit S box, called F Table, and each round of G is keyed by eight bits of the key. The key scheduling of Skipjack takes a 10-byte key, and uses four of them at a time to key each G permutation. The rst four bytes are used to key the rst G permutation, and each additional G permutation is keyed by the next four bytes cyclically.
The description becomes simpler (and the software implementation becomes more e cient) if we unroll the rounds, and keep the four elements in the shift register stationary. In this form the code is simply a sequence of alternate G operations and XOR operations of cyclically adjacent elements. In this representation the main di erence between Rule A and Rule B is the direction in which the adjacent elements are XORed (left to right or right to left).
The XOR operations of Rule A and Rule B after round 8 and after round 24 (on the borders between Rule A and Rule B) are consecutive without application of the G permutation in between. In the unrolled description these XORs are of the form W2 = G(W2; subkey) Note that Rule A mixes the output of the G permutation into the input of the next G permutation, while Rule B mixes the input of a G permutation into the output of the previous G permutation (similarly in decryption of Rule A), and thus during encryption Rule B rounds add little to the avalanche e ect, and during decryption Rule A rounds add little to the avalanche e ect.
In this paper we consider variants of Skipjack which are identical to the original version except for the removal of a few XOR operations. We use the name Skipjack-(i 1 ; : : : ; i k ) to denote the variant in which the XOR operations mixing two data words at rounds i 1 ; : : : ; i k are removed, and the name Skipjack-3XOR as a more mnemonic name for Skipjack-(4,16,17), which is the main variant we attack. Note that the removal of these XOR operations does not remove the e ect of any other operation (as could happen if we removed the XORs of the Feistel structure of G, which would eliminate the e ect of the corresponding F tables).
Useful Observations

Observations Regarding the Key Schedule
The key schedule is cyclic in the sense that the same set of four bytes of the subkeys (entering a single G permutation) are repeated every ve rounds, and there are only ve such sets. In addition, the key bytes are divided into two sets: the even bytes and the odd bytes. The even bytes always enter the even rounds of the G permutation, while the odd bytes always enter the odd rounds of the G permutation. 
Decryption
As in most symmetric ciphers, decryption can be done using encryption with minor modi cations. These modi cations are (1) reordering the key bytes to K = (cv 7 ; cv 6 ; :::; cv 0 ; cv 9 ; cv 8 ), (2) reversing the order of the round counters, and then (3) encrypting the reordered ciphertext C = (cb 3 ; cb 2 ; cb 1 ; cb 0 ; cb 7 ; cb 6 ; cb 5 ; cb 4 ) gives the reordered plaintext P = (pb 3 ; pb 2 ; pb 1 ; pb 0 ; pb 7 ; pb 6 ; pb 5 ; pb 4 ).
The mixings with the round numbers (counters) are often used to protect against related key attacks. In Skipjack, if these mixings are removed, the following stronger property would hold: Given a plaintext P = (pb 0 ; pb 1 ; :::; pb 7 ), a key K = (cv 0 ; :::; cv 9 ) and a ciphertext C = (cb 0 ; :::; cb 7 ) such that C = Skipjack K (P ), then decryption can be performed using encryption by P = Skipjack K (C ), where K = (cv 7 ; cv 6 ; :::; cv 0 ; cv 9 ; cv 8 ), P = (pb 3 ; pb 2 ; pb 1 ; pb 0 ; pb 7 ; pb 6 ; pb 5 ; pb 4 ), and C = (cb 3 ; cb 2 ; cb 1 ; cb 0 ; cb 7 ; cb 6 ; cb 5 ; cb 4 ).
This property could be used to reduce the complexity of exhaustive search of this Skipjack variant by a factor of almost 2 (26% of the key space rather than 50% in average) in a similar way to the complementation property of DES: Given the encrypted ciphertext C1 of some plaintext P, and the decrypted plaintext C2 of the related P under the same unknown key, perform trial encryptions with 60% of the keys K (three keys of each cycle of 5 keys of the rotation by two key bytes operations; e cient implementations rst try two keys of each cycle, and only if all of them fail, they try the third keys of the cycles). For each of these keys compare the ciphertext to C1, and to C2 (i.e., C2 in which the bytes are reordered as above). If the comparison fails, the unknown key is neither K nor K . If it succeeds, we make two or three trial encryptions, and in case they succeed we found the key.
Complementation Properties of the G Permutation
The G permutation has 2 16 ?1 complementation properties: Let G K0;K1;K2;K3 ( x1; x2) = (y1; y2), where K0; K1; K2; K3; x1; x2; y1; y2 are all byte values, and let d1; d2 be two byte values. Then, G K0 d1;K1 d2;K2 d1;K3 d2 (x1 d2; x2 d1) = (y1 d2; y2 d1):
G has exactly one xpoint for every subkey (this was identi ed by Frank Gi ord, and described in sci.crypt). Moreover, we observed that for every key and every value v of the form (0; b) or (b; 0) where 0 is a zero byte and b is an arbitrary byte value, G has exactly one value x for which G(x) = x v. It is unknown whether this property can aid in the analysis of Skipjack.
Di erential and Linear Properties of the F Table
We generated the di erential and linear distribution tables of the F 4. One-bit to one-bit di erences are possible, such as 01 x ! 01 x (where the subscript x denotes a hexadecimal representation) with probability 2=256.
In the linear approximation We studied the di erential corresponding to these characteristics, and computed their exact probabilities by summing up the probabilities of all the characteristics with the same external di erences. We found that the characteristic (a; 0) ! (0; b) has the same probability as a di erential and as a characteristic, as there are no other characteristics with the same external di erences.
(0; b) ! (a; b) and (a; b) ! (a; 0) with the same a and b as above have over a thousand small-probability counterparts with the same external di erences, whose total probability is slightly smaller than the probabilities of the original characteristics. Thus, the probability of the di erentials are almost twice that of the original characteristics (e.g., 137088=2 32 = 2 ?14:94 instead of 73728=2 32 = 2 ?15:83 in one of the cases).
We had also investigated other di erentials of G. The characteristics we described with probability of around 2 ?10:42 (and other lower probability characteristics with zero di erences in the rst and fourth rounds of the G permutation) do not have any counterparts, and thus the corresponding di erentials have the same probabilities as the characteristics. The best other di erential we are aware of is 002A x ! 0095 x with probability 2 ?14:715 , and the best possible di erential with the same input and output di erences is 7F 7F x ! 7F 7F x with probability It is interesting to note that (due to its design) many criteria used in other ciphers are neither relevant to nor used in Skipjack. For example, a di erence of one input bit in a DES S box cannot cause a di erence of only one bit in its output, but there are many such instances in the F table of Skipjack.
Another observation is that due to the switchover from Rule A to Rule B iterations, the data between rounds 5 and 12 is very badly mixed. As mentioned earlier, on the border between the two rules (after rounds 8 and 24), the leftmost word is exchanged with word 2, and the new word 1 is XORed with the new word 2. We observed that the output of the G permutation in round 5 becomes the input to the G permutation in round 12, una ected by other words (but XORed with the xed value 8 9 = 1). Thus, this word is not a ected by any other word during 8 consecutive rounds. A similar property occurs in word 3 from round 7 to round 11, and in word 4 from round 6 to round 10. On the other hand, from round 5 to round 12 word 2 (renamed later to word 1) is a ected several times by the other words, and the G permutation is applied to it several times, but it does not a ect other words. Moreover, from round 13 to round 16, this word a ects directly or indirectly only two of the three other words, and therefore, the input of the second word in round 5 never a ects the fourth data word twelve rounds later. 6 4 Cryptanalysis of Skipjack Reduced to 16 Rounds
Di erential Cryptanalysis of Skipjack with Reduced Number of Rounds
The di erential attack we describe here for 16-round Skipjack is considerably faster than exhaustive search. This attack is based on our original attack 2] with additional improvements based on Wagner's observations 8].
The best characteristics of 16-round Skipjack that we are aware of use the characteristics of the G permutation described above. The plaintext di erence is When we replace the characteristics by the corresponding di erentials of G, the probability grows to about 2 ?71 . However, when we view the two G permutations in rounds 8 and 9 (una ected by di erences from other words) as one new permutation, its probability is about 2 ?16 , and thus the probability of the di erential grows to about 2 ?58 .
Given the ciphertexts of many plaintext pairs with the di erence (a; 0; a; 0; 0; 0; 0; b), it is easy to identify and discard most of the wrong pairs in a 0R-attack.
Such an attack requires about 2 60 pairs. We observe that only a four-round characteristic of the rst four rounds is required, with probability about 2 ?21 , and that when the characteristic holds, the truncated (word-wise) di erences in rounds 5{16 are xed. In this case we choose about 2 22 chosen plaintext pairs, and can discard most of the wrong pairs, except for a fraction of 2 ?16 of them. Thus, about 2 6 = 64 pairs remain. Now we use a second observation that the same set of subkeys is used in the rst and the 16th rounds. We try all the 2 32 possible sets of subkeys and for each remaining pair we encrypt the rst round and verify that the characteristic of G holds, and decrypt the last round and verify whether the expected di erence (i.e., the di erence of the third ciphertext word) holds in the input of the last G permutation. The probability that a wrong set of subkeys does not discard a pair is 2 ?16 2 ?10:4 = 2 ?26:4 , and thus only the correct 32-bit subkey is expected to be proposed twice, by two di erent remaining pairs, and thus can be identi ed. This attack can be applied e ciently in 2 16 steps for each analyzed pair, i.e., a total complexity of 2 22 steps. Similar techniques (or even exhaustive search of the remaining 48 bits of the key) can complete the cryptanalysis.
Linear Cryptanalysis of Skipjack with Reduced Number of Rounds
Linear characteristics are built in a similar way where XORs are replaced by duplications and duplications are replaced by XORs of the subsets of parity bits 1]. As Rule A and Rule B di er essentially in this way, we can have similar analysis for linear cryptanalysis (except that we use linear characteristics rather than di erentials). The probability of the best linear characteristic we found is about 1=2 + 2 ?35:5 , and thus the attack seems to require more known plaintexts than the total number of possible plaintexts. However, this number can be reduced below 2 64 by using shorter characteristics.
Modi ed Variants of Skipjack
Skipjack uses alternately eight rounds of Rule A and eight rounds of Rule B. In this section we investigate whether other mixing orders strengthen or weaken the cipher. A simple example of a modi ed design uses alternately four`Rule A' rounds and four`Rule B' rounds. We found an attack on this 16-round cipher which requires only about 2 10 chosen plaintexts and about 2 32 steps of analysis to nd the subkey of round 3.
When Rule A rounds and Rule B rounds appear in reverse order (i.e., Rule B is applied rst), and four rounds of each are applied consecutively, then only two pairs are required to nd the last subkey.
These few examples indicate that the order of Rule A and Rule B rounds can have a major impact on the security of modi ed variants of Skipjack. Further study of modi ed variants will shed more light on Skipjack's design principles.
A New Cryptographic Tool: The Yoyo Game
Consider the rst 16 rounds of Skipjack, and consider pairs of plaintexts P = (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) and P = (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) whose partial encryptions di er only in the second word in the input of round 5 (we will refer to it as the property from now on). As this word does not a ect any other word until it becomes word 1 in round 12, the other three words have di erence zero between rounds 5 and 12.
We next observe that given a pair with such a property, we can exchange the second words of the plaintexts (which cannot be equal if the property holds), and the new pair of plaintexts (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) and (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) still satis es the property, i.e., di ers only in the second word in the input of round 5. Given the ciphertexts we can carry out a similar operation of exchanging words 1.
The Yoyo game starts by choosing an arbitrary pair of distinct plaintexts P 0 and P 0 . The plaintexts are encrypted to C 0 and C 0 . We exchange the rst words of the two ciphertexts as described above, receiving C 1 and C 1 , and decrypt them to get P 1 , P 1 . Now we exchange the second words of the plaintexts, receiving P 2 and P 2 , and encrypt them to get C 2 and C 2 . The Yoyo game repeats this forever.
In this game, whenever we start with a pair of plaintexts which satis es the property, all the resultant pairs of encryptions must also satisfy the property, and if we start with a pair of plaintexts which does not satisfy the property, all the resultant encryptions cannot satisfy it.
It is easy to identify whether the pairs in a Yoyo game satisfy the above property, by verifying whether some of the pairs achieved in the game have a non-zero di erence in the third word of the plaintexts or in the fourth word of the ciphertexts. If one of these di erences is non-zero, the pair cannot satisfy the property. On the other hand, if the pair does not satisfy the property, there is only a probability of 2 ?16 that the next pair in the game has di erence zero, and thus it is possible to stops games in which the property is not satis ed after only a few steps. If the game is not stopped within a few steps, we conclude with overwhelming probability that the property is satis ed. This game can be used for several purposes. The rst is to identify whether a given pair satis es the above property, and to generate many additional pairs satisfying the property.
This can be used to attack Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds in just 2 14 steps. For the sake of simplicity, we describe a suboptimal implementation with complexity 2 17 . In this version we choose 2 17 plaintexts whose third word is xed. This set of plaintexts de nes about 2 33 possible pairs, of which about 2 17 candidate pairs have di erence zero in the fourth word of the ciphertexts, and of which about one or two pairs are expected to satisfy the property. Up to this point, this attack is similar to Wagner's attack on 16-round Skipjack 8] . We then use the Yoyo game to reduce the complexity of analysis considerably. We play the game for each of the 2 17 candidate pairs, and within a few steps of the game discard all the pairs which do not satisfy the property. We are left with one pair which satis es the property, and with several additional pairs generated during the Yoyo game which also satisfy the property. Using two or three of these pairs, we can analyze the last round of the cipher and nd the unique subkey of the last round that satis es all the requirements with complexity about 2 16 . The rest of the key bytes can be found by similar techniques.
This game can also be used as a distinguisher which can decide whether an unknown encryption algorithm (given as an oracle) is Skipjack reduced to 16 rounds or a random permutation.
The above Yoyo game keeps three words with di erence zero in each pair. We note that there is another (less useful) Yoyo game for Skipjack reduced to 14 rounds (speci cally, rounds 2 to 15), which keeps only one word with difference zero. Consider pairs of encryptions P = (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) and P = (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) which have the same data at the leftmost word in the input of round 5. As this word is not a ected by any other word until it becomes word 2 in round 12, we can conclude that both encryptions have the same data in word 2 after round 12. Given a pair with such an equality in the data, we can exchange the rst word of the plaintexts, and the new pair of plaintexts (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) and (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) still has the same property of equality at the input of round 5. Moreover, if the rst words of the plaintexts are equal (i.e., w 1 = w 1 and thus exchanging them does nothing) we can exchange the second words (w 2 with w 2 ) and get the same property. If they are also equal, we can exchange w 3 with w 3 and get the same property. If they are also equal, we exchange w 4 with w 4 . However, if the property holds, this last case is impossible, as at least two words of the two plaintexts must be di erent. Given the ciphertexts we can carry out a similar operation of exchanging words 2. If words 2 are equal, exchange words 1, then words 4, and then words 3. Also in this case a di erence of only one word ensures that the property is not satis ed. This Yoyo game is similar to the previous game, except for its modi ed exchange process, and it behaves similarly with respect to the new di erence property.
Cryptanalysis of Skipjack-3XOR
In this section we analyze Skipjack-3XOR, which is identical to the original 32-round Skipjack except for the removal of the three XOR operations which mix 16-bit data words with their neighbors at rounds 4, 16 and 17. We show that this version is completely insecure, since it can be broken in one million steps using only about 500 chosen plaintexts.
The starting point of the attack is Wagner's observation 8] that the di erential characteristic we used in the previous section can use truncated (i.e., wordwise) di erences 5]. The attack uses the following characteristic of Skipjack-3XOR: For any 16-bit non-zero value a, the plaintext di erence (0; a; 0; 0) leads to the di erence (b; c; 0; 0) after round 16 with probability 1, which in turn leads to a di erence (d; 0; 0; 0) after round 28 with probability 2 ?16 , for some unspecied non-zero values b; c, and d. This di erence leads to some di erence (e; f; g; 0) in the ciphertexts, for some e; f, and g.
The attack requires two pairs of plaintexts with such a di erential behavior. To get them, encrypt 2 9 = 512 distinct plaintexts which are identical except at their second word. They give rise to about 2 18 =2 = 2 17 pairs, and each pair has the required property with probability 2 ?16 . The two right pairs can be easily recognized since the two ciphertexts in each pair must be equal in their last 16 bits.
The basic steps of the attack are:
1. We know the input di erences and the actual outputs of the 32nd G permutation. Each right pair yields a subset of about 2 16 possible key bytes cv 4 ,. . . ,cv 7 , and the intersection of the two subsets is likely to de ne these 32 key bits (almost) uniquely. This part can be implemented in about 2 16 evaluations of G.
2. The 29th G permutation shares two key bytes cv 4 , cv 5 with the 32nd G permutation, which are already known. 2 16 possible combinations of the two key bytes cv 2 , cv 3 and the inputs to the 30th G permutation in both pairs can be found. A careful implementation of this step requires a time complexity which is equivalent to 2 17 evaluations of G.
3. For each of the 2 16 combinations we still miss the key bytes cv 8 , cv 9 entering the last two F tables in round 30, and the key bytes cv 0 and cv 1 entering the rst two F tables in round 31. Together they are equivalent to a single G, which we call G'. In each right pair, the two encryptions have the same values in G'. We view both right pairs as a super pair of two G' evaluations, whose actual inputs and outputs are known. The analysis of G' takes about the equivalent of 2 9 G evaluations, and thus the total complexity is equivalent to about 2 25 G evaluations.
Since each Skipjack encryption contains 2 5 = 32 G evaluations, the total time complexity of this cryptanalytic attack is equivalent to about one million Skipjack encryptions, and can be carried out in seconds on a personal computer.
